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ABSTRACT
  Nell’esperienza italiana, il principio di laicità va misurato con gli altri principi e 
diritti della Carta Costituzionale, tenuto nel dovuto conto il relativo favore con 
il quale la Carta considera il fenomeno religioso nel suo complesso. In primo 
luogo, è agevole osservare che il motivo religioso allegato dall’autore di una de-
terminata pratica non qualifica, di per sé, la pratica in questione quale esercizio 
del suo diritto alla libertà religiosa. Inoltre, l’ampiezza del diritto all’esposizione 
dei simboli religiosi nell’ambiente o nell’abbigliamento dei fedeli – aspetto della 
libertà religiosa che forma oggetto del presente lavoro – varia in funzione delle 
circostanze del caso.
Nell’interpretazione del principio di laicità, simboli quali il crocifisso e il velo 
femminile non sono del resto qualificati strettamente come “simboli religiosi” 
dall’ordinamento italiano. Adottando una prospettiva storica, si evidenzia co-
me il loro significato trascenda la religione per esprimere un’eredità culturale 
senz’altro radicata. Anche per questa ragione, l’ordinamento non ha espresso 
una scelta categorica verso la tolleranza o l’intolleranza del simbolo religioso, 
motivando piuttosto le scelte operate ad hoc per un dato caso di specie, sulla 
ponderazione dei diritti e degli interessi in gioco, in modo da attuare il miglior 
bilanciamento possibile tra libertà religiosa, autonomia privata, funzione sociale 
della religione, pluralismo, uguaglianza e dignità umana. Esigenze simili sono 
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espresse dalla Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo che valuta i casi di violazio-
ne del diritto alla libertà religiosa da parte dei poteri pubblici dando particolare 
rilievo all’esistenza o meno di forme, subdole o manifeste, di indottrinamento 
religioso.
  Italian secularism measures religious precepts in respect to the Italian Constitu-
tion, a Charter that shows a favourable attitude towards religious practices. The 
present paper focuses on the exhibition of religious symbols in public buildings 
as schools, courts and prisons, on the concealment of female faces by a veil, and 
on the wearing of weapons on religious grounds. The Italian Consiglio di Stato 
has stated that the need to respect religious freedom does not include the right 
to live in a sterile environment. In addition, the crucifix and the female veil are 
not characterized as purely “religious symbols” because they derive from cus-
tomary practices and because their meaning transcends religion and expresses 
a rooted cultural heritage. In this respect, the Italian legal order is not categori-
cally tolerant nor unconditionally intolerant towards these symbols but relies 
on case-by-case analysis of the circumstances that allow the best possible bal-
ance between religious freedom, private autonomy, pluralism, equality, human 
dignity, and the social function of religion. Along the same line, the European 
Court of Human Rights has mainly focused on the existence of subtle or explicit 
forms of religious indoctrination in order to assess whether, in a given case, 
public authorities have impaired individual rights to religious freedom.
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1.  The Evolution of Secularism in Italy in a Nutshell 
Certain European States like Switzerland ask their citizen to declare 
their religious affiliation as part of their identity.  1 In Italy, a common under-
standing of the principle of separation between the State and the Church 
prevents the Italian census (ISTAT) from including questions on religious 
affiliation in its periodical statistical questionnaires distributed to citizens. 
These data are classified as «sensitive» and private.  2 In 2011 and 2012, how-
ever, for the first time ISTAT realised a statistical survey collecting informa-
tion «on a number of aspects affecting living conditions and the integration 
1 See the document  Sources relatives aux données statistiques de l’OFS sur les religions 
on line in French at https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/
langues-religions/religions.assetdetail.1900342.html (08.05.2017).
2 A. FERRARI, S. FERRARI, Religion and the Secular State: The Italian Case, http://www.
iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Italy.pdf (last accessed on 08.05.2017: unless explicitly stated, 
the websites quoted in this report were accessed on 05.07.2017).
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process of Foreign nationals in Italy», including their religious affiliation.  3 
Even though, comprehensive figures on religious affiliation of Italian citi-
zens and residents are unavailable. 
However, it is acknowledged that a large majority of the Italian popula-
tion professes the Catholic religion, Muslims are considered to be the sec-
ond major religion present in contemporary Italy (one million followers), 
and Christians Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews and Valdensians are 
widely represented. 
The presence of Muslim in Italy is recent, whereas Jews and Valdensians 
have been present from centuries in the country, even though always as a 
small minority (50.000 followers). 
Both religious groups have enjoyed civil rights since 1848, when King 
Carlo Alberto di Savoia signed Lettere Patenti in favour of Valdensians and 
shortly after in favour of Jews.  4
During the same year, a first general expression of secularism led to the 
1848 Statute named «Law Sineo», in force since the Italian unification of 
1861 and enacting the motto “libera Chiesa in libero Stato”. The law is «the 
starting point of anti-discrimination law in Italy»  5, since it states «differ-
ence in religious membership does not justify any exception in the enjoy-
ment of political and civil rights and in the admissibility to civil and military 
offices».  6
Another major step towards Secularism was the signature of the Lat-
eran Pacts of 1929, putting an end to the dispute between the then new-
born Italian State and the Catholic Church, designing their reciprocal 
rights and duties and establishing the territorial borders of the Vatican 
3 The survey was conducted in the framework of a wider one on the «Condition 
and Social Integration of Foreign Citizens» and provides precise figures on the religious 
affiliation and practices of foreigners living in Italy. The results of the statistical survey 
and the explanatory document are available on line (08.05.2017) at https://www.istat.it/
it/files/2015/10/Religione-tra-gli-stranieri.pdf?title=Religione+tra+i+cittadini+stranie
ri+-+02%2Fott%2F2015+-+Testo+integrale.pdf and the methodological explanation ac-
companying the survey: https://www.istat.it/it/files/2015/10/NotaMetodologica_Statistica-
Report_Religione.pdf?title=Religione+tra+i+cittadini+stranieri+-+02%2Fott%2F2015+-
+Nota+metodologica.pdf.
4 See B. DI PORTO, Valdesi ed Ebrei, le due storiche minoranze religiose dal Risorgimento 
alla Repubblica”, in La Rassegna Mensile di Israel, Vol. 64, No. 1, 1998, pp. 7-12.
5 See M. VENTURA, Religion and Discrimination Law in Italy, European Consortium for 
Church and State Research, Oxford Conference, 29 September – 2 October 2011, on line at 
http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/research/Oxford%20--%20Italy.pdf.
6 Ibidem.
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State.  7 The Pacts were modified through an agreement signed on Febru-
ary 18th, 1984.  8
After the Second World War, the «Assemblea Costituente», formed by 
leading Catholic and Marxist philosophers,  9 wrote the Italian Constitution 
of the new republican State, including the principle of secularism voiced by 
the catholic components and opposed to the proclamation of atheism and 
the prohibition of religious practices, present in the constitutions of many 
socialist States.
The principle of Secularism is expressed by the following articles of the 
Italian Constitution:
“Art. 7: The State and the Catholic Church are independent and sov-
ereign, each within its own sphere. Their relations are regulated by 
the Lateran pacts. Amendments to such Pacts, which are accepted by 
both parties, shall not require the procedure of constitutional amend-
ments.
Art. 8: All religious denominations are equally free before the law. 
Denominations other than Catholicism have the right to self-organi-
zation according to their own statutes, provided these do not conflict 
with Italian law. Their relations with the State are regulated by law, 
based on agreements with their respective representatives.
7 See M. VENTURA, Italy, Wolters Kluwers, 2013, pp. 33 ff. on The clash with the Roman 
Catholic Church in the Liberal Age. 
8 The whole regime is governed, on the Italian side, by the following laws: Law 1929 
n. 810 «Esecuzione del Trattato, dei quattro allegati annessi e del Concordato, sottoscritti 
a Roma tra la Santa Sede e l’Italia l’11 febbraio 1929»; Law 1929 n. 847 «Disposizioni per 
l’applicazione del Concordato dell’11 febbraio 1929 fra la Santa Sede e l’Italia, nella parte re-
lativa al matrimonio»; Law 1985 n. 121 «Ratifica ed esecuzione dell’Accordo, con Protocollo 
addizionale, firmato a Roma il 18 febbraio 1984, che apporta modificazioni al Concordato 
lateranense dell’11 febbraio 1929, tra la Repubblica italiana e la Santa Sede»; Law 1985 n. 
222, «Disposizioni sugli enti e beni ecclesiastici in Italia e per il sostentamento del clero 
cattolico in servizio nelle diocesi». 
9 Especially, Giorgio La Pira and Giuseppe Dossetti, working with the marxist phi-
losopher Lelio Bassi, all appointed by the leader of the Christian Democrats Aldo Moro 
and the leader of the Communist Party Palmiro Togliatti. See A. BARBERA, La laicità come 
metodo, Final text of the report presented at the first meeting of Il Cortile dei Gentili. 
Spazio di dialogo fra credenti e non credenti, Università di Bologna – Pontificium Con-
silium de Cultura Bologna, Aula Magna di Santa Lucia, 12 febbraio 2011, in Forum di 
Quaderni Costituzionali.
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/
paper/0269_barbera.pdf). 
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Art. 19: Anyone is entitled to freely profess their religious belief in 
any form, individually or with others, and to promote them and cel-
ebrate rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to 
public morality.
Art. 20: No special limitation or tax burden may be imposed on 
the establishment, legal capacity or activities of any organisation 
on the ground of its religious nature or its religious or confessional 
aims.”  10
In order to implement art. 8, the Italian Government has set a Com-
mittee with the task of preparing agreements with religious authorities, as 
well as a Committee with the task of studying, informing and making any 
proposal aiming at implementing the constitutional principles of freedom 
of conscience, religion and belief.   11
The Italian Republic recognizes religious authorities through agree-
ment with religious representatives. The most important one is the one 
that regulates the relations between the Italian State and the Catholic State 
(Concordato, 1929, renewed in 1984).  12 The agreements with other religious 
denominations are subject to the previous recognition of their legal person-
ality by the Ministero dell’Interno.  13
Up to now, the Italian government has signed the following intese:
Religion Date of Agreement
Law ratifying  
the agreement
Tavola valdese
21 February 1984 Law 449/1984
25 January 1993 
(modified)
Law 409/1993 
4 April 2007 Law 68/2009
Assemblee di Dio in Italia (ADI) 29 December 1986 Law 517/1988
10 https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf. 
11 http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/commissioni.html#1.
12 http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_ 
seg-st_19290211_patti-lateranensi_it.html; http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/con-
fessioni/accordo_indice.html#1. 
13 See para 2.4. of Law 1929, n. 1159 (03.05.2017). 
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Unione delle Chiese Cristiane 
Avventiste del 7° giorno
29 December 1986 Law 516/1988 
6 November 1996 
(modified)
Law 637/1996 
4 April 2007 Law 67/2009 
Unione Comunità Ebraiche in 
Italia (UCEI)
27 February 1987 Law 101/1989
6 November 1996 
(modified) 
Law 638/1996 
Unione Cristiana Evangelica 
Battista d’Italia (UCEBI)
29 March 1993 
16 July 2010 
(modified)
Law 116/1995 
Law n.34/12 
Chiesa Evangelica Luterana in 
Italia (CELI)
20 April 1993 Law 520/1995
Sacra Arcidiocesi ortodossa 
d’Italia ed Esarcato per l’Europa 
Meridionale
4 April 2007 Law n. 126/12
Chiesa di Gesù Cristo dei Santi 
degli ultimi giorni
4 April 2007 Law n. 127/12
Chiesa Apostolica in Italia 4 April 2007 Law n. 128/12
Unione Buddista italiana (UBI) 4 April 2007 Law n. 245/12
Unione Induista Italiana 4 April 2007 Law n. 246/12
Istituto Buddista Italiano Soka 
Gakkai (IBISG) 
27 June 2015 Law n. 130/2016
The absence of Islam is due to the lack of universally recognised rep-
resentatives invested with legal personality and capable to negotiate agree-
ments with the Italian government.  14
14 A. FERRARI, S. FERRARI (note 3) 438 and in Note 41, observe «All religions that 
have concluded an intesa have had to adapt their organization to the dualistic model of 
Western Christianity, which involves stressing the distinction between religious or holy 
people and activities on the one hand and people and activities without such qualifi-
cations. The “confessional” model adopted by the Jewish communities to conclude the 
intesa is an interesting example, and it will also be very interesting to see what will be 
the choice of the Muslim community. In 2005 the Ministry of Interior created a consulta-
tive body, the Council for Italian Islam, whose members were selected by the Minister 
himself. This body has to face many problems and especially 1) the fact that the its task 
was far from homogeneous, concerning matters connected to immigration and integra-
tion that did not regard only Muslims; and 2) the fact that this (implicit) governmental 
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2.  The Display of Religious symbols in Public Buildings and in Spaces 
Accessible to the Public
The Catholic Church has governed the central part of the Italian pen-
insula – with great variations in its geographical extent – for over a thou-
sand years, from the eight century until the dissolution of the Catholic 
State in 1870. It had a central role in the public sphere even outside those 
boundaries. 
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, family law found its 
sources in Canon law and the registers of births, marriages, deaths were 
kept by Church ministers; public education and the whole welfare system 
was entirely organized by Catholic institutions. Secular congregations of 
catholic believers as the “confraternite” provided various services of assis-
tance to the sick poor people. 
As a consequence, a large majority of Italian public buildings display 
religious signs, symbols and images related to the Catholic faith. These 
religious signs and symbols are often enshrined in beautiful and valuable 
pieces of art of even in frescos in walls. However, the display of reli-
gious symbols and signs in paintings, sculptures and buildings has never 
raised, up to now, any legal problem in connection with the exercise of 
religious freedom and secularism. No statutory provision deal with these 
topics. 
The only exception concern the display of the crucifix as a piece of 
furniture of classrooms and courtrooms. The Italian provisions regarding 
display of the crucifix are different according to the function of the public 
building where the crucifix is displayed. 
2.1.  Public Schools
The display of the crucifix in public Italian schools is as old as public 
schools are. 
The Act of November 13, 1859, n. 3725 introduced compulsory pub-
lic education in Italy, confined religious education to primary and middle 
selection of the Islamic representatives was in conflict with the Constitution that forbids 
public authorities to select the leaders of religious organizations. In any case, since 2008 
this Council stop to be called».
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school and suppressed religious education in high schools. The law was 
implemented with the King’s Decree of September 15th, 1860, n. 4336, 
whose art. 140 prescribed that the crucifix be part of the furniture of 
classrooms.  15 
Subsequently, a King’s Decree of February 6, 1908, n. 150 also provided 
for the display of a crucifix in each classroom.
These rules are no longer in force, but they are reproduced with no 
substantial change in the following rules, that are still in force: 
–  Article 118 of the King’s Decree of April 30th, 1924, n. 965, regu-
lating institutes of secondary education. Chapter XII, under the 
title ‘premises and furniture of schools”, provides: every “middle 
school” (a school for pupils from 10 to 14 years old) displays the 
national flag; in every classroom, the image of the crucifix and the 
portrait of the King are displayed”;
–  Article 119 of the King’s Decree of April 26th, 1928, n. 1297, regu-
lating primary schools, provides that the furniture of each school 
class include the crucifix.
More recent ministerial acts confirm that the crucifix is part of the fur-
niture of classrooms: namely the Act of the Ministry of Education of Oct. 
19th, 1967, n. 367/2527 (Buildings and furniture of primary schools) and 
the Directive of the Minister of Education of Oct. 3rd, 2002, n. 2666 and 
annexed Note n. 2667. 
These rules have been brought in front of the Italian Supreme Admin-
istrative Court: the Consiglio di Stato and led to three main rulings of the 
Court.
A first ruling was delivered on April 27th, 1988, n. 63/88, upon re-
quest of the Italian Ministry of Education. In this ruling the Consiglio di 
Stato affirms that the Italian rules on the display of the crucifix in public 
schools are compatible with the Italian Constitution and with the Patti 
Lateranensi and the subsequent agreement signed at Palazzo Madama in 
1983.
A second ruling, in the same line, was given by the Sezione VI, 13 
February 2006, n. 556 to decide the case introduced by Ms. Lautsi in 
15 G. SEVERINI, Libertà Religiosa e uso dei simboli religiosi, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto 
Pubblico Comunitario, fasc.1, 2015, at 49 f.f. 
250 Alberto Fabbri - Ilaria Pretelli
order to fulfil the rule of the exhaustion of domestic remedies and en-
able a recourse to the ECHR.  16 Ms. Lautsi, an atheist, pretended that the 
display of the crucifix in the public school attended by her children in-
terfered with her right to raise her children according to her philosophi-
cal ideas. However, the school, the administrative district court (TAR 
Veneto) and then the Consiglio di Stato rejected her instances (see also 
infra at. 3.2.).
A third ruling, confirming the former, was delivered on 15th February 
2006, n. 4575/03 2482/04, on extraordinary appeal to the President of the 
Italian Republic introduced by the Union of the Atheists and Rationalists 
Agnostics (in Italian UAAR) and Mr. Giorgio Villella as legal representative 
of the Union. 
In this ruling, the Consiglio affirms that the display of the crucifix does 
not interfere with secularism since it is a passive display linked to the Italian 
historical roots and it does not aim at any religious indoctrination. 
Meanwhile, the rules on the display of the crucifix had also been brought 
in front of the Italian Constitutional Court. However, with the decision 15 
December 2004, n. 389, the Constitutional Court declared its lack of juris-
diction due to the non-statutory nature of the rules providing for the display 
of the crucifix. 
Eventually, the second ruling of the Consiglio di Stato mentioned above 
led to two decisions by the ECHR. The first one on Nov. 3, 2009 stating that 
the display of the crucifix in classrooms:
–  Infringes the right of parents to educate their children according to their 
religious and philosophical beliefs 
–  Violates the right of pupils to believe or not to believe; 
–  Violates the neutrality that public authorities must observe in the exer-
cise of public functions.
The second one, a decision of 8 March 2011 by the Grand Chamber, 
reverses these conclusions. 
It states that the States have a margin of appreciation only limited by 
the ban of any religious indoctrination in respect of Article 2, Protocol. 
1 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms. 
16 Foro it. 2006, III, 181 and the comment by A. Travi, “Simboli religiosi e giudice 
amministrativo”.
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2.2.  Judicial Courts
The display of the crucifix in Courtrooms has no legal basis, as explic-
itly acknowledged by the Minister of Internal Affairs with a note n. n. 5160 
/ M / 1 of Oct. 5, 1984.  17
In practice, however, the crucifix is indeed part of the furniture of Ital-
ian Court rooms and that is by virtue of an act of the Minister of Justice of 
May 29th, 1926, n. 2134/1867 (“Placement of crucifixes in courtrooms”), 
which states:
“I prescribe that in courtrooms, on the bench of judges and next to 
the effigy of His Majesty the King, the crucifix be reinstalled, accord-
ing to our tradition. The revered symbol shall be a solemn warning of 
truth and justice. The Administrative officers of the courts shall make 
arrangements with the municipalities so to ensure that the above pre-
scription is executed with care and artistic skill, as it is appropriate to 
the high function of justice.”
In some cases, the crucifix is integrated in the furniture of courts itself. 
In one case, a judge, Hon. Luigi Tosti, refused to carry out his office in 
a court where there was a crucifix and asked to carry out his office in a 
courtroom without crucifix or at least to have exposed the Jewish menorah 
in addition to the crucifix. The case was brought in front of the Consiglio 
Superiore della Magistratura (hereinafter CSM), in Italy the competent au-
thority for disciplinary sanctions against judges. 
On 23 November 2006, the CSM stated that the display of the crucifix 
in courtrooms has no legal basis and appears to be in conflict with the con-
stitutional principle of secularism as well as with the principle of freedom 
of conscience and religion.  18
Moreover, the criminal section of the Italian High Court of Justice con-
sidered that the refusal to carry out his office by the judge did not integrate 
the crime of “omissione di atti d’ufficio”.  19
17 In response to a question from the Ministry of Justice (Prot. 612 / 14.4 of 29 May 
1984) on the maintenance of the crucifix in the courtrooms.
18 CSM, Sezione disciplinare; ordinanza 23 novembre 2006, Foro it. , 2007, III, 589. 
19 Cassazione penale sez. VI 17 February 2009 n. 28482.
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However, the refusal to carry out his office persisted despite the avail-
ability for Hon. Tosti of a courtroom without crucifix. 
Thus, a subsequent decision of 25 May 2010 by the CSM removed the 
judge from his functions, regardless of his claim to have the crucifix re-
moved from all of the courtrooms and not only from the one where he 
would be holding hearings.
The Italian High court, sitting in civil plenary session,  20 upheld the sec-
ond decision stating that the refusal of the judge to carry his functions in 
courtrooms where no crucifix was displayed was unjustified. 
2. 3.  Polling Stations 
The crucifix is also often displayed in polling stations, given that in 
most cases school classrooms are used as polling stations and, as already 
observed, crucifixes are part of the school classroom’s furniture. 
Political debates were frequent, since the crucifix – as a catholic symbol 
– could influence the choice of pious people and favour catholic parties, 
especially during the times where the “Christian democrats” was the first 
party in Italy. 
No statutory provision prescribes the display or the ban of the display 
of the crucifix. Case law shows that the presence of the crucifix is not com-
pulsory nor forbidden.
The Corte d’Appello di Perugia, 10 April 2006, has stressed that the re-
moval of the crucifix by the president of the polling station is perfectly 
legitimate in order to preserve neutrality of the polling station. Similarly, 
a decision by the Criminal Section of the Italian Corte di Cassazione has 
characterized as perfectly legitimate the refusal of an officer of a polling 
station to perform its functions in the presence of a crucifix.  21 However, it 
is not forbidden to leave the crucifix where it is during polling operations: 
the Tribunale di Napoli (29 November 2003; 31 March 2005),  22 and Bologna 
(24 March 2005),  23 have rejected claims for the removal of the crucifix from 
20 Cassazione, SS.UU., March 14, 2011, n. 5924 on line at http://www.giurcost.org/
casi_scelti/Cass.sent.5924-2011.htm.
21 Cassazione Pen., 1 March 2000, n. 439 Montagnana, Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 
2000, p. 1121 ff. and the comment by G. Di Cosino “Simboli religiosi nei locali pubblici: le 
mobili frontiere dell’obiezione di coscienza” at 1131.
22 Foro it. 2005, I, 1575.
23 Dir. famiglia 2006, 1, 151: “Non è verosimile che un non-simbolo, quale è il crocifisso 
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polling stations, grounded on the potential impairment of the neutral char-
acter that polling stations must have. 
2.4.  The Religious Symbols in Places of Detention; The Exposure Right
The principle of secularism is fully realized even in detention facilities  24, 
from which the subjects are partially limited in the exercise of certain free-
doms.
The presence of the subject person  25, which is fully part of “all” an-
nounced in the Article 19, constitute the reason to check the degree of ap-
plication of constitutional principles, in the continuous search for limits 
that the same facility requires to be safeguarded.
The possibility for a detainee to get full satisfaction of constitutional 
rights must be seen within the prison context, in which are highlighted not 
only the provisions on structural criteria, safety and order in the first place, 
but it must also be considered the same needs of the other inmates, which 
act in the same physical space.
It should be noted that the issue of religious symbols in places of deten-
tion has become especially significant because the prison population under-
went changes in the last twenty years, during which the inmates who profess 
Islamic faithful increased exponentially  26.
The relevant legislation, the law 354 of 1975  27 and the DPR 230 of 
2000  28, establishes very clearly the “conditioned” rights, however the same 
requires an application that can find different ways of operating.
per i non cristiani e per i non credenti possa per essi avere una qualche influenza negativa, 
o costituire una remora psicologica riguardo all’espressione del voto od ai convincimenti 
religiosi e, men che meno, provocare un turbamento dell’animo tale da privare, in tutto o in 
parte, il votante delle sue capacità morali, critiche e di giudizio”.
24 Issue 2-2015 The rights of prisoners, in costituzionalismo.it, line journal.
25 In which we include those sentenced, inmates and defendants.
26 The Department of Prison Administration to 30/11/2016, noted a prison population 
of 55,251 persons, of whom 29,000 have declared their membership of the Catholic faith and 
in 6000 the Muslim. See. A. CUCINIELLO, Islam in Italian prisons, ISMU Foundation, Milan, 
2016, in http://www.ismu.org/2016/10/lislam-nelle-carceri-italiane/ . 
27 L. July 26, 1975, n. 354, On the penitentiary regulations and enforcement of measures 
involving deprivation or limit freedom, (ord. penit.) In G.U. August 9, 1975, n. 212, SO, L. 
10 October 1986, n. 663, Amendments to the law on the penitentiary and on the execution of 
custodial measures and limiting freedoms, in G.U. 16 October 1986 n. 241, S.O.
28 D.P.R. 5 June 2000, n. 230, Regulations on the provisions concerning the penitentiary 
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The recognized fundamental right Is the right to religious freedom 
which finds expression not only in the freedom to practice one’s faith but 
also to be educated into it and to practice the cult  29. The proposed frame-
work open a series of commitments and obligations for the prison adminis-
tration to allow the effective enjoyment and pursuit of the recognized right. 
The prison regulation strengthens this condition and clarifies the leeway. In 
particular, it provides the right to participate in rituals of its own confession 
and to practice the cult.
With reference to the object of our analysis, the religious symbols, pris-
oners and internees are permitted to “expose their own images and symbols 
of their religion in the individual room or in their assigned area in the com-
mon room”  30.
and on measures which deprive or limit freedom, (reg. esec.), in G.U. n. 195 of August 22, 
2000, S.O. 
29 L. 354/1975, Art. 26, Religion and cult practices. 
Prisoners and internees are free to profess their own religion, to educate themselves in 
it and to practice the cult. 
In institutions it has ensured the celebration of the rites of Catholic worship. Each insti-
tute is involved at least one chaplain. 
The members other than the Catholic religion have the right to receive, at their request, 
the assistance of ministers of their religion and celebrate the rites. This last was amended by 
art. 8, L. 10 October 1986, n. 663. 
This Article was repealed by. 299, Legislative Decree no. 30 May 2002, n. 113 and art. 
299 DPR 30 May 2002, n. 115, with the date indicated in art. 302 of the same decree. Sub-
sequently, following the adjustments made by Press December 6th, 2002 (G.U. December 6, 
2002, n. 286), the new formulation of the above items 299 does not provide for such a repeal. 
30 D.P.R. 230/2000, Art. 58. Manifestations of religious freedom 
1. Prisoners and internees are entitled to participate in the rites of their religion pro-
vided they are compatible with the order and security of the institution and not contrary to 
law, according to the provisions of this Article. 
2. Is allowed to prisoners and internees who wish to exhibit, in their own individual 
room or in their own space in the room belonging to more places, images and symbols of 
their religion. 
3. It’s possible, during leisure time, to individual prisoners and internees to worship 
in their religious profession, provided that is expressed not in harassing behaviour for the 
community. 
4. For the celebration of the rites of Catholic worship, each school is equipped with one 
or more chapels in relation to the needs of the religious service. Until the entry into force of 
the implementing provisions of the cartel referred to in Article 11, paragraph 2, of the agree-
ment, with additional Protocol signed in Rome on 18 February 1984, the agreement amend-
ing the Lateran Concordat of 11 February 1929 between the Italian Republic and the Holy 
See, ratified and implemented by the law of 25 March 1985 n. 121, the practice of worship, 
education and spiritual assistance of the Catholics are insured by one or more chaplains in 
connection with the same needs, institutions in which they operate as chaplains, in charge of 
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The legal provisions recognizes to the detainees to express themselves 
through objects that refer to their faith and that are the expression of it and 
grants the manifestation of the spirituality, so that the prison environment, 
in particular the cell, can become a place in which carry out their own per-
sonality.
This process is carried out not only providing the possibility to hang 
sacred images on the wall, from crucifix to icons, but also finds fulfillment 
in owning and using properties suitable for the cult. We can mention the 
sacred texts, prayer rug, bells or ritual dresses  31.
For the aspect that concerns the possibility to enrich their space with 
images considered sacred, there are no particular problems  32, since the ac-
tion is left to the full autonomy of the detainees in the relationship with 
their peers in the management of their own spaces.
Issues may arise instead in the ways these objects are introduced into 
the prison facility and their protection during the ordinary living activities 
in prison, such as the control of the cells.
About the former, particular attention is given to written texts. Here 
two conditions arises. The first relating to the language used in the texts. 
In fact, the lack of preparation of the personnel involved, whether the text 
is in its original language or translated, could serve as basis for the text to 
coordinating the religious service is entrusted to a of them from the regional prison superin-
tendent, or, in the case of institutions for minors, the juvenile rehabilitation center director, 
the inspector heard chaplains. 
5. For religious instruction in devotional practices of members of other religious de-
nominations, even in the absence of ministers, the institution’s management provides suit-
able premises. 
6. The school administration, to ensure the detainees and internees who request them, 
education and spiritual assistance, as well as the celebration of the rites of faiths other than 
Catholicism, makes use of the ministers indicated those religious denominations whose rela-
tions with the Italian state are regulated by law; also it makes use of the ministers indicated 
to that end by the Ministry of the Interior; may, however, have recourse, even outside of the 
above cases, the provisions of Article 17, second paragraph, of the law. 
31 Since not all prisons have an internal regulation governing the practical aspects of 
intramural life, it recollects with service orders. With this tool the discipline Director dif-
ferent situations. We can cite the case of accepted books, which must be free of hard cover 
to prevent the concealment of illegal objects or substances, the use or not of clothing with 
hood, for issues also linked to personal recognition, the number of animals it is allowed to 
keep, up to the economic value of particular moral or sentimental value objects. 
32 It should be noted the work Religious assistance in prison. Rights and right to worship 
in prisons of Lazio, Report of research, October 2012, CSPS, Documentation Centre for the 
Study of Religions and Political Institutions in Post-Secular Society, University of Rome Tor 
Vergata.
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become a tool for fundamentalist propaganda, especially if brought from 
the outside. The other condition is related to the staff that introduces these 
texts, the ministers or volunteers. It could be resolved through the provi-
sion of texts purchased directly by the prison administration and consulted 
in the library, but it’s an option difficult to achieve  33, both for the number of 
copies purchased and the plurality of texts that should be available in place.
As to the latter, relating to the prison activity, the degree of intervention 
of prison officers on the same objects should be evaluated, even the mere 
inspection of places of detention may involve contact with the objects caus-
ing the loss of sacredness for the mere fact of being touched with “impure” 
hands. The fact that the religious observance takes place in a prison envi-
ronment must not make us lose sight of the special conditions in which the 
rights are exercising.
The religious symbolism is also achieved through the right to wear 
clothing or accessory that expresses its own religious beliefs, or constitutes 
an element of faith to prove membership.
This is regulated by art. 7 of law n° 354/75 and by art. 9 and 10 of 
Presidential Decree n° 230/2000  34. The provisions take into account both 
33 It should be noted that the text should still have the hard cover, to prevent the 
concealment of objects.
34 Art. 7. Clothing and equipment 
Each subject is equipped with linens, clothing and use effects in sufficient quantity, in 
good state of repair and cleanliness and which will ensure the satisfaction of normal living 
needs. 
The dress is a plain fabric and decorous manner. 
And it allowed the working outfit when it became necessary by the activity. 
The defendants and sentenced to prison terms of less than one year can wear clothing of 
their property, provided they are clean and affordable. The suit provided to defendants still 
needs to be different from that of convicted persons and internees. 
Prisoners and internees may be allowed to make use of the kit of their property and 
items of particular moral or sentimental value. 
Art. 9. Clothing and equipment 
1. The objects that make up the bed kit, items of clothing and underwear, as well as 
other use effects that the administration is required to pay to prisoners and internees, are 
given, with specific reference to their quality charts, divided by men and women, established 
by ministerial decree. 
2. The leaders and the effects mentioned above have appropriate properties with the 
changing seasons and the particular climatic conditions of the areas where institutions are 
located: their quantity must allow exchange that guarantees good cleaning and storage con-
ditions. 
3. For each boss or effect is expected in the duration of use. 
4. The administration replaces, even before the expiry of the term, leaders and deterio-
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a plan that highlights the requirement for the prison administration to 
provide the clothing needed to ensure “normal demands of life”  35, and a 
personal plan, that grants freedom to dress clothes when the penalty con-
ditions are met. It remains the condition necessary that the dress should 
be made of solid color, fabric and decorous appearance, however, gar-
ments that are “affordable”.
The items of special moral and sentimental value may be allowed, pro-
vided that they don’t have substantial economic value and don’t prove to be 
incompatible with “the orderly conduct of the outdoors”.
It is noted that the Supreme Court judgment  36 based on an order of the 
Supervisory judge who allowed to a prisoner subjected to the system of art. 
41-bis ord. penit., to receive and hold particularly expensive clothing and 
rated effects. If the anticipated deterioration is attributable to the prisoner or interned, they 
must compensate the damage. 
5. The institution’s health requires qualitative and quantitative changes in the bed kit, of 
laundry items and apparel related to particular needs of individual subjects. 
6. Minors dress, however, civilian garb. 
7. The personal laundry items and apparel as well as the effects of use delivered to de-
tainees and internees are noted, with subsequent changes in a card, a copy of which is kept 
by the person and another guarded by management and sent after a transfer. 
8. The institute care direction for each detainee and internee, after cleaning, be restored 
own clothes. 
9. The detainees and internees, who make use of clothing and personal equipment be-
longing to them which can not be washed with normal procedures used to those provided 
administration, must do so at their own expense. 
10. The Administration shall provide civilian clothing to dimittendi, when they do not 
do so at their own expense in conditions. 
Art. 10. Equipment and personal property 
1. The Rules of Procedure shall determine the cases in which prisoners and internees 
may be allowed to make use of their property and equipment also it requires what are the 
effects kit that can be used. 
2. It’s ensured a laundry service for prisoners and internees can access, even at their 
own expense. 
3. It’s admitted the possession of a special moral or sentimental value objects should not 
have a significant economic value and are not inconsistent with the orderly conduct of life 
in an institute. 
35 It’s curious that the legislator uses this terminology, which finds expression in the text 
only on another occasion about the penitentiary buildings must be equipped to carry out as 
well as locals for personal living needs, including local common activities. The expression 
does not create an obligation on the part of the administration to provide “religious” cloth-
ing, but could include the failure obligation to impose a boss that is contrary to the religious 
needs expressed by the prisoner, internee or the accused. 
36 Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Penale, n. 42605 of 2013. 
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accessories  37 of luxurious type. Given the special status of those who are 
subjected to this kind of treatment also linked with the symbolism related 
to a criminal nature hierarchy, the judges highlighted that the staff apparel 
is subject to the same criteria as for personal items, so “they should not 
have high economic value and should not be incompatible with the orderly 
conduct of the institution’s life”.
Similar considerations could be made with the use of the accessories 
which have the same characteristics described above for clothing and for 
personal items  38.
To complete the analysis, we must also mention the Charter of val-
ues, citizenship and integration  39, in particular the Article 1  40 and 25  41, 
in which a great deal of attention is paid to religious symbols, the Rec-
ommendation of the Committee of Ministers of 10 October 2012  42 on 
foreign prisoners that emphasises that “the detainees have the right to 
practice or change their religion or belief, and are protected from any 
constraint in this regard”  43 and the Charter of rights and duties of detain-
ees and internees  44.
37 It may be noted that the provisions of the internal regulations, nor the 2011 Circular 
from the Department financial administration, provide for a maximum number of animals 
per person. 
38 Since Regulation penitentiary institute internal Milano Opera, is expected as cloth-
ing admitted “coat, jackets, vests, and of modest value duvets; bathrobes; underwear; Single 
layer plaid and cotton bedspread; thin belts with small buckle single layer; footwear not 
lower gym or walking; plastic slippers and shower; track suits, large and small towels; paja-
mas winter and summer; summer costumes (shorts, Bermuda shorts and T-shirts), summer 
jackets; books and magazines available for sale outdoors, glasses (all clothing with no hood 
and no belt) “and how various kinds allowed” eyeglasses and necklaces and bracelets made 
of thin rubber”. 
39 Decree of the Ministero dell’Interno of 23 April 2007, published in the G.U. of 15 
June 2007.
40 “1. The Italian is committed because every person from the first moment is on Italian 
territory would enjoy the fundamental rights, regardless of sex, ethnicity, religion and social 
condition. [...]”. 
41 “25. Basis of its religious and cultural tradition, Italy respects the symbols and signs 
of all religions. No one can be offended by the signs and symbols of a religion different from 
his [...]”. 
42 Recommendation CM / Rec (2012).
43 Thus article 30.1.
44 Annex to the Ministero della Giustizia of 5 December 2012, in implementation of the 
DPR June 5, 2012, n. 136, in which the contents of the Charter in Article was established. 69 
paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree 30 June 2000, n. 230, as amended by art. 1 of the DPR 
June 5, 2012, n. 136. 
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3.  Scope of the Right of Freedom of Religion 
3.1.  The Asserted Overlapping between the Historical and Religious Me-
aning of the Crucifix 
The Italian experience of secularism, as regards to the display of the 
crucifix, has been famously tested with the right of freedom of religion, pro-
tected, inter alia, by art. 9 of the European Covenant of Human Rights,  45 in 
the context of the case Lautsi v. Italy.  46 
In this respect, Italian Courts have put forward the idea that the cru-
cifix is more than solely a religious symbol and that, for non-believers, is a 
reminder of the influence of Christianity in the shaping of the European 
civilization. The principle of secularism itself seems to find roots on the 
saying attributed to Jesus Christ: «Render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s» calling for a separation 
between the political and the spiritual spheres.  47 
According to the Consiglio di Stato, in the perspective of non-believers 
the crucifix is «the symbol of civilization and Christian culture, in its histori-
cal roots, as a universal value, regardless of any specific religious belief». In 
addition, the Consiglio di Stato has explicitly stated that the 1948 Constitu-
tion of the Italian Republic, in guaranteeing religious freedom and equality 
of treatment to all religions, does not prevent the display of the crucifix, 
which is part of the Italian historical heritage. In this respect, the message 
spread by the crucifix does not refer to a specific religion but to a common 
heritage. The displaying of the crucifix in classrooms – states the Consiglio 
di Stato – is thus compatible with secularism because secularism is not at 
odds with religion. 
45 See also art. 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the 
UN General Assembly in Paris on December 10th, 1948 (G.A.Res.217A): “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance”.
46 Application n. 30814/06 to the ECHR, decided on November 3rd, 2009 by the Chamber 
and reversed with the decision by the Grand Chamber March 18th, 2011. All available in the 
official database of the ECHR (HUDOC) at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng# (03.05.2017). 
47 ἈπόįοĲİ οὖν Ĳὰ ΚαίıαȡοȢ ΚαίıαȡȚ țαὶ Ĳὰ Ĳοῦ Θİοῦ Ĳῷ Θİῷ Mt 22, 15-22; Mc 12, 13-
17; Lc 20, 20-26. See, e multis, O. CULMANN, Dio e Cesare, Roma, AVE, 1996, O. FUMAGALLI 
CARULLI, “A Cesare ciò che è di Cesare, a Dio ciò che è di Dio”. Laicità dello Stato e libertà delle 
Chiese, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2006. 
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Secularism means, in this perspective, that each State has a neutral at-
titude and does not interfere with religion, recognizing the independence 
of any religious sphere. It also means that the State explicitly acknowledges 
the existence of religious authorities and the historical importance of reli-
gious thought in the construction of the European legal culture. In practice, 
the display of the crucifix equates the display of other symbols of the Italian 
national identity. 
It has been pointed out that many European flags display a cross: among 
these, the British flag that contains three crosses, based on three important 
saints of Christian tradition and in Turkey, the flag displays a symbol of 
the Islamic religion, without interfering with the secularism imposed by 
Atatürk. To the same extent, the presence of the Italian and European flags 
in buildings is not considered as possibly discriminating foreign residents.  48 
3.2.  Display of the Crucifix and Indoctrination
In the aforementioned decision, the Consiglio di Stato stresses that the 
presence of the crucifix in the classroom does not force pupils or teachers 
to express their beliefs in religious matters.  49 
The synthesis on the different European interpretations of secularism, 
in the translated words of the Consiglio di Stato, reads as follows:
«So there is no doubt that secularism is to be understood in different 
ways, and in particular: 
–  in a way it is understood in the legal order of Great Britain – a secu-
lar Sovereign State, although closely bound to the Church of Eng-
land, which has allowed the secular legislator to dictate standards 
in matters that are internal to the church itself (a relatively recent 
example is the law on women priests); 
48 G. SEVERINI, Libertà Religiosa e uso dei simboli religiosi, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto 
Pubblico Comunitario, fasc.1, 2015, p. 49 ss. observes: “La Union flag, o Union jack, reca le 
croci di San Giorgio (Inghilterra), Sant’Andrea (Scozia) e San Patrizio (Irlanda del Nord). 
La bandiera già ottomana della Turchia, Stato del Consiglio d’Europa, reca la mezzaluna con 
una stella: simbolo che da circa cinquecento anni è percepito come della religione islamica e 
che è rimasto fermo con la laicizzazione di Atatürk”.
49 Consiglio di Stato, April 27th, 1988, n. 63/88, see: http://www.giurcost.org/
decisioni/2008/0063s-08.html.
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–  in a different way is that principle understood in the French legal 
order – where secularism, sanctioned in Art. 2 of the Constitution 
of 1958), is a goal that the State pursues, and in fact has often pur-
sued, with “mortification” (mortificazione) of the independence of 
organizational confessions (lois Combes) and of any free individual 
expression of religious faith (law on the display of religious sym-
bols); 
–  in an even different way in the federal United States of America 
– in which the although rigid separation between the State and 
religious faiths, imposed by the First Amendment to the federal 
Constitution, does not prevent a diffused pietism in civil society, 
whose roots may be found in the religious tradition of the Pilgrim 
Fathers, and whose expressions are multiple and even institutional 
– e.g. the explicit religious declaration in the banknotes – “in God 
we trust”-; the large support – through fiscal provisions concerning 
any financial aid to religious confessions and their charitable activi-
ties (social, educational, etc.) in the framework of the typical liberal 
private-horizon of the American society);
–  and in another way, finally, it is understood within the Italian con-
text, where the linguistic symbol [of secularism] is used to indicate:
–  reciprocal autonomy between the temporal order [i.e. State sov-
ereignty] and the spiritual order [Religious Authority] and conse-
quent abstention of the State from entering into the internal affairs 
of religious confessions (Art. 7, 8 Constitution) ; 
–  protection of fundamental rights of the person (art. 2), regardless 
of religion; 
–  legal equality among all citizens, being irrelevant for this purpose 
their different religion (art. 3); 
–  respect of the independence of confessions and their freedom to 
organize themselves according to their own statutes, provided 
these are not in conflict with the Italian legal order (art. 8, 2nd co.), 
–  for all persons, and not just for Italian citizens, protection of free-
dom in religious matters, and that [means freedom] to believe, not 
to believe, to manifest in public or in private their faith, to practice 
religion (art. 19); 
–  ban of any form of discrimination against religious organizations 
because of their ecclesiastic structure or of the purpose pursued 
through their religion or worship (Art. 20). 
The constitutional rules relied upon by the Italian Court to 
outline its conception of secularism show a clearly favourable at-
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titude towards the phenomenon of religion and towards the struc-
tures that promote religious beliefs. This attitude is expressed by 
the clear limits that the Italian Constitution has set to the possibil-
ity of the Italian State to pass statute and bills on its relations with 
religious confessions; legislative activities in these matters may only 
be practiced in the form of agreements with both the religion prac-
ticed by the majority and with any other religious confession (art. 
7, 2nd co., and Art. 8, 3rd co.)».  50
3.3.  The Grand Chamber’s View on the Crucifix in classrooms
In its Grand Chamber judgment, the European Court of Human Rights 
seems to have acknowledged the Italian assertions on the historical meaning 
of the crucifix.  51 The Court held that no issue arose under Article 9 because 
of the lack of any form of indoctrination and that there had been no viola-
tion of Article 2, protecting the right of pupils to education nor of Protocol 
1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court underlined 
that the major visibility of Christianity was related to the circumstance that 
Catholicism is, by numbers, the religion of the majority in Italy and stressed 
the differences between visibility, processes of indoctrination, compulsory 
teaching of religion and religious intolerance:
«a crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive symbol and this point 
is of importance […], particularly having regard to the principle of 
neutrality […]. It cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils 
comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious 
activities […]».  52
In this respect, the enjoyment of religious freedom does not entail the 
right to live in a sterile environment, but is directly linked to the attitude of 
public authorities, whose activities must not be discriminatory.  53 In this re-
50 Consiglio di Stato, cit. at fn. 16.
51 See supra (fn. 46) Sec e multis, J. TEMPERMAN (ed.), The Lautsi Papers: Multidisci-
plinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, Leiden, Boston, 
Brill/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012.
52 ECHR, Grand Chamber, 12.03.2011, Lautsi v. Italy, point 72.
53 G. SEVERINI, cit. passim. 
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spect, it has been said that the meaning of a cross or of a crucifix differs ac-
cording to the place where it is displayed: whether it is a place of worship, a 
public place, a flag etc. In a place of worship a simple cross or a crucifix are 
religious symbols, object of veneration by believers. In non-religious places, 
such as schools or flags, crosses and crucifixes may still carry religious val-
ues for believers, but would not have this meaning for non-believers.  54
These arguments are at odds with those previously advanced by the 
German constitutional court on the «protection from exposure» recog-
nised by the German constitution.  55 The dissent as to the understanding of 
secularism, mentioned by the Italian Consiglio di Stato as regards to other 
countries, is blatant also comparing the Italian and the German decisions, 
with the ECHR considering particularly wide the margin of appreciation of 
States as regards of the exposure of the population to the crucifix in public 
schools.
4.  Religious Clothing 
The Italian Constitution recognizes the right to religious freedom, in its 
double aspect of freedom of conscience and freedom of worship in art. 3, 
19 and 20 Const. 
The limits set by the Constitution concern the prohibition of «worship 
contrary to morality». The prohibition includes a fortiori worship contrary 
to Italian law. Accordingly, the characterisation of a practice as religious by 
its adepts is not sufficient for its acceptance as a religious practice whenever 
it contravenes public policy and basic norms. The Corte di Cassazione stated 
it explicitly in a case where the authors of voodoo practices implying slavery 
had tried to justify their actions as “religious practices”.  56
54 Ibidem.
55 Bundesverfassungsgericht, May 16th,1995, BVerfGE 93, 1 1 BvR 1087/91, known 
as Kruzifix-Urteil (Classroom Crucifix Case). Extracts of the decision and of dissenting 
opinions are available in English at https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-trans-
lations/german/case.php?id=615 (03.05.2017).
56 Cassazione penale, sez. V, 18/11/2008, (ud. 18/11/2008, dep.30/12/2008), n. 48350, 
note C. PENISI, “Le pratiche di magìa nera e i riti Vudu non sono riconducibili ad alcuna 
confessione religiosa: nuove sette e nuovi movimenti religiosi, libertà di coscienza, libertà 
religiosa e tutela dei diritti umani”, in Dir. famiglia, fasc.1, 2010, p. 37. See F. BASILE, Il diritto 
penale nelle società multiculturali: i reati culturalmente motivati, in Ragion pratica, 1/2013, 
pp. 9-48.
264 Alberto Fabbri - Ilaria Pretelli
The «Charter of Values, Citizenship and Integration»  57 in sections 25 
and 26 declares that:
«25. On the basis of its religious and cultural tradition, Italy respects 
the symbols and the signs of all religions. No one can say to be of-
fended by the signs and symbols of a religion different from his/her 
own. As established by international Charters, it is convenient to edu-
cate the youth to respect the other’s religious beliefs, without finding 
in them elements of division.»  58
No specific statutory provision exists as regards to the wearing of re-
ligious signs and symbols. In practice, freedom of worship may only be 
limited if its exercise contrasts with the basic principles on which the Italian 
society is grounded. Up to now, two religious garments have been subject 
to judicial analysis as regards to the potential impairment of Italian consti-
tutional values and principles: the female veil and the Sikh’s kirpan. 
4.1.  Rules on the Full Female Veil
Within the Italian legal order, persons may not wear garments conceal-
ing their facial features without justified reason. 
These rules are art. 85 del R.d. 18 June 1931 n. 773 “È vietato comparire 
mascherato in luogo pubblico” (it is forbidden to appear masked in a public 
place) and art. 5 of Law 22 May 1975, n. 152 (Provisions for the protection 
of public order) [c.d. Law Reale]:
It’s forbidden the use of protective helmets – or any other similar object 
making it difficult to recognize a person – in public places or in places 
open to the public, without justification. It is prohibited in any case the 
use of the aforementioned objects in the course of events that take place 
in a public place or in places open to the public, with the exception of 
sport events that require the use of such garments. The offender shall 
be punished by imprisonment from one to two years and by a fine from 
1,000 to 2,000 Euros. 
57 Supra fn. 39. 
58 The full text of the Charter is available in English on line at the following address: 
http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_char-
ter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_integration.pdf.
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Several Administrative acts explain the functioning of these rules and 
in particular two acts of 1995 and 2000, respectively. Through an act n. 
4/95 of 14 March 1995 by the Minister of Internal Affairs the use of scarfs 
in photographs used for identity cards of citizens professing religious be-
liefs that require the use of scarfs has been authorised. With the act of 24 
July 2000, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has stated that turbans, chadors 
and veils carried for religious reasons «are an integral part of regular cloth-
ing and contribute, as a whole, to identify the wearer, of course as long as 
these keep the face uncovered» and therefore allowed these accessories, in 
accordance with the constitutional principle of religious freedom (Art. 19 
Constitution). In both cases the facial features need to be clearly visible. In 
sum, wearing headscarves in State school and while taking photos for iden-
tity cards is possible to the extent that the face is well visible.  59 
None of various legislative proposal to ban the wearing of burqa and 
niqab in public places has been passed by the Italian Parliament,  60 even 
though public authorities have a wide margin of appreciation as regards to 
the legitimacy of wearing the full female veil.
For this and other reasons, an opinion on the opportunity to introduce 
a specific ban of full female veil in the context a reform of the aforemen-
tioned legal rules (art. 85 del R.d. 18 June 1931 n. 773 and art. 5 of Law 22 
May 1975, n. 152) has been asked to the «Committee for Italian Islam», a 
body created by the Italian government, whose components are experts of 
Islamic law, in part Muslim and in part not.  61 
The Committee «recommends caution in drafting any law prohibit-
ing garments as burqas and niqabs». It explains the non-religious origin of 
these garments and «casts doubt on the existence of a link between burqa 
and niqab, on the one hand, and «Islam» and «religious affiliation» on the 
other».  62
59 Cf. art. 289 of the Royal Decree 635/1940 and the circolare of the Ministry of the 
Interior n. 4/1995.
60 See the proposals n. 2422 May 6th 2009, and n. 2769 of 2 October 2009, respectively at 
http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?Pdl=2422 
and at http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.
asp?Pdl=2769 (03.05.2017).
61 http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/
notizie/Comitato_Islam_italiano/0776_2010_02_11_Islam.
62 http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/
files/19/00036_Comitato_Islam_-_relazione_Burqa_07_10.pdf, p. 4.
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The Committee then concludes: «Referring to ‘Islam’ in a text of the 
law may carry the risk of feeding the ongoing polemics, or to spark off new 
ones. We therefore recommend to omit in the text of law any reference to 
religion or Islam, limiting the reform to the assessment that, in the prohibi-
tion in Article 5, «clothing called burqa and niqab» must be considered in-
cluded, regardless therefore of the reasons – religious and «Islamic» or pos-
sibly not religious or non-Muslim – that push some people to wear them. In 
parallel, Article 85 T.U.P.S. could be amended in the first paragraph with a 
reference to an unconditional prohibition for use in public places or open 
to the public «of any means or garment designed to make difficult to recog-
nize the person», except of course the justified reasons arising from health 
needs or personal security or workplace needs. In the third paragraph, an 
explicit rule may be introduced, according to which: «The local public se-
curity authorities may by provide for exceptions to the ban set in the first 
paragraph in the context of places open to the public by informing people 
with specific posters’, in order to authorize the use of the burqa or the niqab 
in mosques. In any event, purging the law from any reference to religion 
seems to be the best means not to feed controversy and polemics»  63.
According to Section 26 of the Charter «In Italy there are no restrictions 
on people’s attire, as long as it is chosen freely and it is not detrimental to 
his/her dignity. It is not accepted to cover the face because this impedes the 
person’s recognition and hinders establishing relations with the others».  64
4.1.1.  Italian Practice on the Female Veil: The Limits of the «Free Choi-
ce», Human Dignity and Equality of Men and Women
The wearing of the veil cannot be imposed by a man to a woman, be it 
her husband or her father.  65 
In a case where the veil was not at stake but a man had asked the Court 
to respect his religious and cultural beliefs that allowed physical punish-
ment to women, the Corte di Cassazione stressed that these beliefs could 
63 Ibidem.
64 Ibidem.
65 P. MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Responsabilità genitoriale e libertà religiosa, in Dir. fami-
glia, fasc. 4, 2012, p. 1707 ff.
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not lead to any reduction of the legal sanction prescribed by Italian law.  66 A 
religious behaviour deserves legal protection only insofar it does not con-
trast with basic principle of the Italian legal order, such as the equality of 
men and women.   67
The Corte di Cassazione sanctioned through the application of aggra-
vated circumstances a man who had insulted a Muslim woman and had tore 
her veil off.   68 According to an author, «in this case, the court interpreted 
the dominantly Catholic environment as an element leading to the defini-
tion of the act as a racist act against a different religious culture».  69
The Court of Cremona, in a case of 2008,  70 decided that the conduct of 
a Tunisian woman, a witness in a criminal proceeding, that went to court 
wearing a burqa but immediately uncovered her face upon demand of iden-
tification by a police officer simultaneously exhibiting its identity card was 
not in contrast with art. 5 of l.152/75. The judge stated that the use of burqa 
in public places or space open to the public is not forbidden by that law; 
even though the ban is possible in case of objective problems of public 
order and difficulties of recognition that can’t be overcome with a simply 
request for an identification document. 
66 Cassazione 12 August 2009, n. 32824 in (2010) Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Eccle-
siasticaœ, p. 1033.
67 Cassazione penale, 26 aprile 2011, n. 26153, sez. VI, in Cass. pen., fasc.9, 2012, 
p. 2962 and the comment by F. PIQUÉ, “La subcultura del marito non elide l’elemento 
soggettivo del reato di maltrattamenti né esclude l’imputabilità del reo”. The personal 
dignity of women is seen by a part of the Italian public opinion offended by a garment 
that erases – socially – her figure and the representation of her individuality. It is also 
often stressed that the human dignity of women is very negatively affected by burqas and 
niqabs since these garments decrease the autonomy of women. It has been said that the 
burqa reduces women’s vision and their sideways glance as well as their ability to move. 
However, the argument remains weak in a society where garments reducing women’s abil-
ity to move – such as high heels and other so called «fashion victims» garments – are ac-
cepted and diffused. As pointed out by the Yemenite photographer Boushra Almutawakel 
in relation to her conscience-awakening photo shooting (on line at http://www.theguard-
ian.com/artanddesign/gallery/2013/may/17/pictures-of-week-mother-daughter-doll, niqab 
and burqas are, in the first place, an instrument to protect women from men’s disrespect-
ful comments that are frequent in certain societies. In such circumstances, it is preferable 
to avoid judging women wearing a veil and instead promote initiatives for respecting the 
role of women as human beings and in particular as social human beings.
68 Cassazione 4 April 2006, n 11919 in (2006) Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica 
1052, Cass. 8 January 2010, n. 286 in (2010) Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica 1033.
69 M. VENTURA, Religion and Discrimination Law in Italy, cit. p. 12.
70 Decision of November 27th, 2008, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen. 2010, 2, 957 with a comment 
by Provera.
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Several administrative bodies have issued municipal bans concerning 
the full female veil. 
In one case, a ban was issued for all kinds of veil in a school, probably 
under the influence of French legislation. Most of these orders were local 
and have been struck down by the judiciary or by superior administrative 
bodies. 
In another case, the mayor of a Piedmonts village had spread in his 
town posters containing the ban of wearing burqa and niqab in public 
places. The Court of Turin ordered to remove all of them, and ordered 
the mayor (together with his successor that had kept the posters where 
they had been put) to indemnify two citizens offended by the panel (for 
an amount of 11.500 Euro), to publish the decision in the local media 
(«Corriere Valsesiano») and in the Facebook page of the mayor who had 
issued the municipal order, a space regularly used by him for provocative 
statements as regards to the integration of immigrants.  71 In a third case, 
the Director of a public school in Friuli Venezia Giulia had adopted “Re-
strictive measures affecting the use in schools of expressive signs of reli-
gious affiliation, in particularly the Islamic veil”. These measures banned 
the use of any kind of Islamic veil, “also in the form of the hijab, i.e. that 
of more common use, which covers only the hair and neck, leaving the 
face free”. With a note of February 17th, 2015  72, the Garante regionale 
dei diritti della persona expressed the view that the measures were «in-
consistent with the objectives therein proclaimed: to counter racism, bul-
lying or religious discrimination. In a democratic society objectives of a 
high level of coexistence and social inclusion should be pursued in such 
a way that they do not impair the civil rights of minorities and that they 
erase the diversity of which are these are carriers, and therefore social 
pluralism, but shall rather have the objective of teaching diversity, dia-
logue and equal chances»  73.
The Ministero dell’istruzione, dell’università e della ricerca Ufficio Scolas-
71 http://www.olir.it/ricerca/getdocumentopdf.php?lang=ita&Form_object_id=6361. 
72 http://www.olir.it/ricerca/getdocumentopdf.php?lang=ita&Form_object_id=6487. 
73 “Il Garante regionale dei diritti della persona ritiene innanzitutto che la misura del 
divieto di indossare il velo islamico in classe, anche nelle forme del hijab, appare incoerente 
con gli obiettivi proclamati di contrastare forme di razzismo, bullismo o di discriminazione 
religiosa. In una società democratica, obiettivi di un più elevato livello di convivenza ed 
inclusione sociale dovrebbero essere perseguiti non comprimendo i diritti civili delle mino-
ranze ed eliminando la diversità di cui sono queste sono portatrici, e dunque il pluralismo 
sociale, bensì educando alla diversità, al dialogo e alle pari opportunità”.
 The Right to Freedom of Religion 269
tico Regionale per il Friuli Venezia Giulia – Direzione Generale, immediately 
struck down the measures with a subsequent note.  74 
The Consiglio di Stato, by judgment VI, June 19th, 2008, n. 3076, stated 
that Art. 5 of Law n. 152 of 1975 does not provide any legal ground for the 
legitimacy of an order of a mayor of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia which had 
banned to walking in public wearing the veil that covers the face, because 
unrelated to the powers of a mayor.  75
More recently, Lombardy has enacted regional legislation banning the 
use of helmets or any other garment obstructing recognition of persons in 
public places without justification.  76 A petition asking to declare these norms 
of discriminatory character – filed by four associations of citizens involved 
with the protection of immigrants – has been rejected by the Tribunale di 
Milano on April 20th, 2017. The ban is in force since January 1st, 2016. 
4.1.2.  A Brief Anthology of the European Court of Human Rights’ Deci-
sions on the Female Veil 
The practice of the ECHR on headscarves is conspicuous. 
Most of these cases were brought against France, Switzerland and Tur-
key.  77 The French ban concerning the full female veil has been declared 
compatible with art. 8, 9 and 14 of the ECHR in the case S.A.S. v. France.  78
Previously, in many cases, applications by female applicants having re-
fused to remove their headscarves on grounds of religious beliefs had been 
74 http://www.olir.it/ricerca/getdocumentopdf.php?lang=ita&Form_object_id=6480.
75 See the Ordinanza 2009 n. 3 Comune di Azzano Decimo in materia di uso di mezzi 
atti a rendere difficoltoso il riconoscimento della persona.
76 Based on art. 5 of law 153/1975, the delibera bans any: “uso di caschi protettivi o di 
qualunque altro mezzo atto a rendere difficoltoso il riconoscimento della persona in luogo 
pubblico o aperto al pubblico senza giustificato motivo”.
77 See e multis E. RELAÑO PASTOR, Towards Substantive Equality for Religious Believers 
in the Workplace? Two Supranational European Courts, Two Different Approaches, in Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion, 2016, vol. 5, pp. 255-279; J. RINGELHEIM, State Religious Neu-
trality as a Common European Standard? Reappraising the European Court of Human Rights 
Approach, ivi, 2017, vol. 6, pp. 24-47; K. ALTIPARMAK, O. KARAHANOGULLARI, European Court 
of Human Rights: After Sahin: The Debate on Headscarves Is Not Over, in European Consti-
tutional Law Review, vol. 2, pp. 268–92. 
78 See ECHR, June 26th, 2014, Application n. 43835/11.
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declared inadmissible. In El Morsli v. France,  79 the Court held that the deni-
al of a visa to France, as a consequence of the refuse by a Moroccan woman 
to remove her headscarf for the limited time necessary for an identity check, 
could not ground a complaint for the violation of her right to religious free-
dom, since it served legitimate aims of public safety. 
In Dahlab v. Switzerland  80 and Kurtulmus¸ v. Turkey  81 the Court declared 
inadmissible the complaints of, respectively, a primary-school teacher and a 
university professor, that were prevented from wearing a headscarf during 
the exercise of their functions. The Courts insists that, in democratic societ-
ies, the State is free to prescribe «dress codes» inspired by the principles of 
secularism and neutrality of the civil service, especially – but not only  82 – in 
the framework of education.  83
Inadmissible were declared also applications by students that were pro-
hibited to enter schools and universities with a headscarf.  84 
In other cases, declared admissible, the Court decided for a non-viola-
tion of art. 9.  85 
In the case of Leyla S¸ahin v. Turkey  86 the court notes 
«the emphasis placed in the Turkish constitutional system on the pro-
tection of the rights of women. Gender equality – recognised by the 
European Court as one of the key principles underlying the Conven-
tion and a goal to be achieved by member States of the Council of Eu-
rope – had also been found by the Turkish Constitutional Court to be 
a principle implicit in the values underlying the Constitution. In ad-
79 See ECHR, March 4th, 2008, Application n. 15585/06. 
80 See ECHR, February 15th, 2011, Application n. 42393/98.
81 See ECHR, January 1st, 2006, Application n. 65500/01.
82 See Ebrahimian v. France, November 26th, 2015, Application n. 64846/11 concerning 
a hospital employee.
83 According to the German Constitutional Court, it is part of the individuals’ freedom 
of faith, protected by the German Constitution, the right of teachers to where headscarves 
during their work. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, September 24th, 2003, Case No. 2BvR 
1436/02 available in English at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Ents-
cheidungen/EN/2003/09/rs20030924_2bvr143602en.html (03.05.2017). 
84 See ECHR, January 1st, 2006, Köse and Others v. Turkey, Application n. 26625/02, 
and ECHR, June 30th, 2009, Aktas v. France, Application n. 43563/08, Bayrak v. France, 
n. 14308/08, Gamaleddyn v. France, n. 18527/08, Ghazal v. France, n.29134/08, J. Singh v. 
France n. 25463/08 and R. Singh v. France, n. 27561/08.
85 See ECHR, December 4th, 2008, Dogru v. France, Application n. 27058/05, and 
Kervanci v. France Application n. 31645/04.
86 See ECHR, November 10th, 2005, Application n. 44774/98.
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dition, like the Constitutional Court, the Court considered that, when 
examining the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish con-
text, there had to be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a 
symbol, which was presented or perceived as a compulsory religious 
duty, may have on those who chose not to wear it. As had already 
been noted, the issues at stake included the protection of the «rights 
and freedoms of others» and the «maintenance of public order» in a 
country in which the majority of the population, while professing a 
strong attachment to the rights of women and a secular way of life, 
adhered to the Islamic faith. Imposing limitations on the freedom to 
wear the headscarf could, therefore, be regarded as meeting a press-
ing social need by seeking to achieve those two legitimate aims, espe-
cially since that religious symbol had taken on political significance in 
Turkey in recent years. The Court did not lose sight of the fact that 
there were extremist political movements in Turkey which sought to 
impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception 
of a society founded on religious precepts. Against that background, 
it was the principle of secularism which was the paramount consid-
eration underlying the ban on the wearing of religious symbols in 
universities. In such a context, where the values of pluralism, respect 
for the rights of others and, in particular, equality before the law of 
men and women were being taught and applied in practice, it was un-
derstandable that the relevant authorities should consider it contrary 
to such values to allow religious attire, including, as in the case before 
the Court, the Islamic headscarf, to be worn on university premises». 
Instead, violations of art. 9 related to religious clothing, grounded on 
specific discriminations, have been recognized in cases that did not concern 
the female veil. In a case against Turkey and involving over a hundred per-
sons affiliated to a religious group known as Aczimendi tarikatÿ, their pun-
ishment for the wearing of their particular clothes in public areas, during 
a public gathering involving proselytism was held contrary to art. 9 by the 
ECHR.  87 In a case against the UK  88, a State where no legislation prohibit-
ing religious clothing is in force, the Court found a violation of art. 9 in the 
87 See ECHR, Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, February 25th, 2010, Application n. 
41135/98).
88 See ECHR, Eweida and Chaplin v. the United Kingdom, January 15th, 2013, application 
nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10.
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balancing operated by UK courts between the right to religious freedom 
of an employee – that wished to wear a cross at work – and the right of her 
employer to ask her to remove it on grounds of corporate image. According 
to the court, the right of an employer to preserve its corporate image could 
not prevail over the right of the employee to wear a religious symbol. Dif-
ferently, the right of a hospital to prohibit the wearing of a cross for safety 
reasons was held to be legitimate in the same case and the ECHR found 
that the right to wear a religious symbol did not prevail over a prohibition 
to wear it for public health and safety reasons.
4.2.  The Kirpan
It’s forbidden to bear weapons in Italy. However sometimes there is 
tolerance towards the other disputed symbol: the kirpan of Indian Sikhs. It 
has been observed that such tolerance is explained by the good integration 
of the Sikhs into the Italian society  89.
Nonetheless, judges have discretion in evaluating the danger of bearing 
the kirpan in specific cases  90.
The address that the Court has taken so far on the possibility, based on 
religious reasons, for the member of the Sikh community to bring the ritual 
dagger kirpan outdoor, seems no longer to find full support.
89 See the Court of Vicenza, 28 January 2009, in http://www.olir.it/documenti/ index.
php? Title = 4950 and of Cremona Court 19/02/2009 n. 15, Riv. en. dir. and proc. pen. 2010, 
2, 957 (sm) commented by A. Provera, The “just cause”: the religious faith as intrinsic limit 
of typicality. According to the judge of Cremona: “Bring shoulder a ritual knife, the kirpan, 
a symbol of belonging to the Sikh religion, has an inherently communicative religious iden-
tity value, given that the conduct is not only optional, but imposed by Sikhism and not it 
can have only an aim clothing ornament. If these are the characteristics, even motivational, 
the agent’s conduct, it must be recognized as they are a considerable justification, based 
on a sound legal support, as place within the protection of freedom of religion, the right 
to profess their faith freely in any form, individually or in association and to disseminate it. 
Considering this, ban the ostentatious by the follower of the Sikh religion of that box cut-
ter would violate the constitutional right of the person to practice their faith outside of his 
place”. See also S. Ferrari, cit. (Note 3) at 448 observe That the decisions are motivated by 
the fact that “the Sikh community is well integrated in north Italy where Sikh specialised 
work as farmers.” 
90 Court of Latina 29 January 2010, in QDPE, 1/201, that convicted for carrying the 
Sikh kirpan. 
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The recent judgment of the Supreme Court, the 1st March 2016  91, point-
ed out that the need for the right to religious freedom finds “always an 
impassable limit in peaceful coexistence and in accordance with the rules of 
public safety”. The judges argue that the ritual dagger has to be considered 
an improper weapon  92 and its religious nature does not constitute a valid 
reason to bring the object outdoor. The assembly based its judgment on 
two opinions issued by the State Council in June 2010  93 and in April 2013  94, 
in which, according to the recognition of “Association Sikhism Religion 
Italy”, it has been showed that the religious purpose (use of the dagger) is 
literally in conflict with a state law that has primacy since the law considers 
only the intended use of the instrument, deriving from its physical charac-
teristics of improper weapon, and doesn’t take account of the significance 
that the holder ascribes to the object nor the religious purposes that the 
knife assumes even in public places  95.
The position taken by the judges of the Court constitutes a literal ap-
plication of the law on carry permit  96, apparently justified by the climate 
of the current historical context. In fact, the formally illegal public be-
haviors that find a justification for religious reasons, may make the job 
of the law enforcement agencies working in the field in the prevention of 
terrorism acts more difficult. By doing so it is conferred priority to the 
dimension of public safety based on preventive reasons, rather than en-
sure the exercise of the right that allows to carry a religious symbol that 
could be an instrument of aggression. One wonders if the attitude shown 
by the judges is the result of an effective safeguarding of social reality or 
it is rather a quick way to give signals of efficiency to the public at the 
expense of religious freedom of a group numerically insignificant in Ital-
ian religious landscape.
In this regard it should be noted that other legal systems legitimate to 
the members of the community of Sikhs the exemption to wear a safety 
91 Supreme Court, First Criminal Section, n. 303/2016.
92 The classification lies in the lack of sharpness of the blade.
93  Council of State, Section One, Gathering of Section of 23 June 2010, n. 02387/2010.
94 State Council, Section One, Gathering of Section 10 April 2013, n. 00135/2013.
95 The Court of Cassazione – Sezione Penale, by judgment of 15 May 2017, no. 24084, 
confirms this new address, claiming that “la decisione di stabilirsi in una società con valori 
di riferimento differenti dai propri, ne impone il rispetto e non è tollerabile che l’attaccamento 
ai propri valori, seppur leciti, porti alla violazione cosciente di quelli della società ospitante”.
96 Law 18 April 1975, n. 110, Additional regulations of the current guidelines for the 
control of weapons, ammunition and explosives, G.U. April 21, 1975, n. 105. 
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helmet when riding a motorcycle to allow the use of the traditional head-
dress  97, as well as it is authorized to police officers to wear the same hat 
instead of the ordinance cap provided that it’s color is navy blue and has the 
symbol of the department on it  98.
5.  Conclusions
The principle of religious freedom, universally recognized  99, finds in 
Italy a place of openness and realization also through its own guarantees 
of the principle of secularism, as its clear from Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 19 and 
20 of the Italian Constitution  100. This principle of promoting a separation 
of orders and ideologies between the State and religious faiths promotes at 
the same time the permanence and development of the religious spirituality 
as an aspect to be safeguarded through the instrument of the agreements 
between the Italian State and the reference religious representatives. The 
recognized contribution of religion to the spiritual progress of society (art. 
4 paragraph II Const.) requires constant attention and a daily verification of 
the model adopted by the Constitution to the religious phenomenon, which 
allows a full exercise of the right to religious freedom not only with refer-
ence to the traditional confessions  101.
Bringing evidence to the situation and the character of the symbols and 
religious signs in Italy in the light of the positions taken by the jurispru-
dence, some aspects arise which show that the Italian legal system is going 
through a transition phase.
In fact, we can see on one hand the reaffirmation of the Christianity that 
identifies the historical and cultural Italian heritage and, on the other hand, 
97 As the case in Britain and Canada. www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/og/og-00003.
htmps/og/og-00003.htm 
98 It happens in the Police Department of New York, https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/12/28/nyregion/new-york-police-department-sikh-beard-turban-policy.
html?rref=collection% 2Ftimestopic 2FNew%%% 20York 20City% 20Police% 20De-
partment & action = click & contentCollection = timestopics & region = stream & module = 
stream_unit & version = days & contentPlacement = 10 = & pgtype collection. 
99 Denote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, art. 18, as a starting 
point the new course taking human rights in international law, http://bib26.pusc.it/can/p_
martinagar/Docs/LRinternazi.pdf. 
100 As stated in the judgment of the Constitutional Court n. 206 of 1989.
101 Using this terminology in reference to confessions belonging to the historical heri-
tage of the Italian people, in an objective assessment. 
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the slow but inexorable rise of new religious movements that are the result 
of the globalization and immigration process.
The actual process of opening to other faiths and forms of religiousness 
is accompanied by the constant secularist drift that animates the Italian civil 
reality, also made up of citizens who not only don’t consider religion a value 
to be defended, but are also hostile to any form of religion  102. As a result, 
there is a part of civil society, for a minority today, which considers totally 
unnecessary a constant dialectic stage not only with institutions, but also 
with other confessions acting on the same territory for the affirmation of 
their religious or atheist values. In this context, religion is becoming “indif-
ferent”, not relevant as a constituent element of each individual’s personal-
ity, but rather as insignificant aspect, therefore not to favor, but not even to 
limit the space in which it finds its own expression.
In this climate, the Italian legal system has however undertaken and 
implemented different paths, designed to ensure religious freedom in the 
different environments in which it may find exercise.
The first path is the one that encourages the adoption of agreements 
with the confessions that present a certain degree of institutional stability 
in the area  103, so as to still held in Parliament the draft laws  104 intend-
ing to promote a law on religious freedom leading to a greater “balance” 
102 We can mention the National Social promotion association called “Union of Ratio-
nalist Atheists and Agnostics”, with the abbreviation “UAAR”, which in its statute art. 3 is 
proposed as a general purpose “demand the abolition of all privileges granted, in law or in 
fact, to any religion, in virtue of equality before the law of religions and philosophical non-
confessional organizations.” The same association was the protagonist in 2014 of an attempt 
to conclude an agreement with the former State art. 8 II paragraph Cost. 
103 The speech obviously has wider, as to understand the situation in which Jehovah’s 
Witnesses with an agreement in 2007 without the approval of the law, or the Islamic reality 
that as the second religion in Italy, still lacks an understanding. 
104 Bill S.2064, Provisions on religious preachings of Cults not the subject of Agree-
ments pursuant to art. 8, third paragraph, of the Constitution and according to constitutional 
principles, by Raffaele Volpi (League) on 29/07/2015; C.2939 , Regulations on religious 
freedom and repeal of the legislation allowed cults, by Fabio Lavagno (PD) and the other 
06/03/2015; C.36, Religious Freedom and repeal of the admitted cults legislation, presented 
by Marco Boato (Mixed-Green Group) on 28/04/2006; C. 134, Religious Freedom and 
repeal of the admitted cults legislation by Valdo Spini (Group Democratic Party of the 
Left-L’Ulivo) on 28/04/2006. Cfr. Proposal for reflection for the issuing of a general law on 
religious freedom: acts of the Study Seminar organized jointly by the Faculty of Political Sci-
ence of the University of Salerno and the Department of theory and history of institutions: 
Naples and Fisciano, 15 , 16 and 17 October 2009, V. TOZZI , G. MACRI , M. PARISI (eds), 
Giappichelli, 2010. 
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between faiths operating in Italy through the elimination of the law on 
churches allowed in 1929 and significant expansion of a common reli-
gious right.
The other is trying to promote tools that ensure and encourage the in-
tegration of many different religious groups in the territory. In this regard, 
committees of participation have been established  105 and approved a Char-
ter  106 that highlights the particular nature of the Italian law, not only as a 
duty owed to those who are on the Italian territory, but also rights that can 
be exercised and collectable.
In the end, most recently, a cultural training tool has been established 
for those who are called to play a position of contact between the faithful 
and the Italian institutions, such as imams, ministers of religion and cultural 
mediators  107.
The undertaken process should create the condition in which the rights 
related to religious freedom are well considered in the social context, al-
lowing their exercise in full knowledge of the Italian historical, social and 
political context in which they operate.
We have to point out that this path is set in a context characterized by a 
strong Catholic origin, which constitutes the social substrate on which Italy 
has been developed.
Therefore it shouldn’t be striking if the model of understanding with 
religions other than Catholic is the conventional one of 1984, and if the 
teaching of religion, as well as the assistance, must always face the spaces 
105 We can show the Council for Italian Islam established by decree in 2005 by the then 
Minister of the Interior Giuseppe Pisanu, and confirmed in 2006 by the new interior minis-
ter Giuliano Amato. In 2010, the Interior Minister Roberto Maroni, forms a Committee for 
Italian Islam, with 19 members, half of Italians, chosen from among experts of Islamic law, 
both Muslim and non. 
In 2012 the Ministry of Andrea Riccardi has given rise to Conference national permanent 
“Religion, Culture and Integration”. 
In February 2015, the Ministry of the Interior Angelino Alfano has chaired a meeting 
with representatives of various communities and Muslim associations, the first episode of the 
one in the Interior Ministry’s intentions would become «a permanent consultation». Basi-
cally it would be a new edition of initiatives already seen with his predecessors. 
106 Charter of citizenship and integration values, Decree 23 April 2007 published in the 
G. U. n. 137, 15.6.2007. 
107 From February 2017 Training course for Imams of rights and duties of the Italian 
Constitution promoted by the Home Office, Department for Civil Liberties and Immigra-
tion, within the National Program FAMI 2014 coordinated by the Interuniversity Consor-
tium Sites (Cois ): in addition to that of Bologna, those of Calabria, Salerno, Bari, Pisa and 
Florence, and the Flaminia Foundation of Ravenna. 
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and possibilities in Catholic life, without forgetting the building of worship, 
or the reference we mean when we speak of religious ministers  108.
Religious symbols fall within this line of thinking. As pointed out, they 
constitute and express the Christian history of the Italian people, and don’t 
acquire a sense of ideological affiliation with the State. The process of secu-
larism, which began with the Constitution of ‘48, requires for its success not 
only uniformity of the regulatory apparatuses to a substantial equality and 
impartiality, but also the preservation of social religiosity, which finds its 
bases and expression in the heritage and tradition.
This must lead to a constant dialectical relationship between the indi-
vidual and the collective, so that the regulatory apparatus can always find 
full realization. However the principle of secularism seems to be increas-
ingly exploited to obtain neutral public spaces, also following the French 
example, that warrants the removal and resizing of all the elements that 
the mere sight may disturb individual consciences or that can lead to the 
presumption an ideologically oriented expression by the civil institutions.
The current events, such as the recent attacks of fundamentalist origin, 
accompanied by reasoning by dyads of society in which we tend to proceed 
with opposite and contrary cataloging  109, lead to limit if not to suppress, all 
forms of religious expression that can’t be classified with Italian/occidental 
parameters, not only as aspects of an advanced secularism, but also as reli-
gious elements which go beyond our spiritual ground, making the religious 
integration more difficult and conflicting.
108 It’s easy to recall the imams who can not be cataloged with the same parameters and 
establishing their function of Catholic priests. 
109 In particular T. RIMOLDI, Religious freedom in Italy. The critical issues, in Coscienza e 
Libertà, no. 51, 2015, p. 68. 
